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Barkume and Bielski: University Patenting Methods

STRICT INTERPRETATION OF 35 U.S.C. § 112:
REQUIRES UNIVERSITIES TO EXAMINE THEIR
PATENTING METHODS
Sharon Barkume* and Michael R. Bielski**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The commercialization of technologies developed at
universities is a catalyst for entrepreneurship and contributes
significantly to economic development in the United States.1 Since
the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act,2 universities have licensed
numerous technologies to both new and established companies;
however, there is still an opportunity to more efficiently translate the
billions of federal research dollars invested in basic and applied
research at academic institutions into commercially viable
*

IP Manager at Sound Interventions and Associate at Barkume and Associates, P.C. J.D.,
cum laude, May 2011, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Register Patent
Agent, March 2000. B.S. Electrical Engineering, 1984, University of Maryland.
**
Assistant Director, Center for Biotechnology at SUNY Stony Brook and Adjunct faculty at
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. J.D., Syracuse University College of Law.
M.S. Neuroscience, Syracuse University. B.S. Biology, SUNY Stony Brook.
1
Roland Helm & Oliver Mauroner, Success of Research-based Spin-offs. State-of-the-art
and Guidelines for Further Research, REV. M ANAGERIAL S CI. 237, 238 (2007).
Two of the main forces of economic life are entrepreneurship and
technological development. Today, in a competitive and globalised
world, the ability to create new innovative products and companies is
crucial for promoting rapid structural change and national or regional
development (NIW/Fhg-ISI 2000). Universities and other public
research organisations are some of the main sources of innovations. The
generation and specifically the application of new ideas, technologies
and scientific knowledge are conducive to economic development, job
creation and the formation of a competitive industrial structure. To spin
off a venture from a research organisation is an excellent way to
commercialise research results and a method by which publicly financed
research will contribute to economic and social welfare and regional
development.
Id. (citations omitted).
2
35 U.S.C. §§ 202-212 (2006 & Supps. IV 2010, V).
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technologies.3
Most university technologies require significant funding to
further develop the prototypes and proof-of-concepts into products
and services that can be sold in the marketplace.4 This funding often
comes from investments made by angel investors, venture capitalists,
and/or corporate partners. These investments are generally made for
the sole purpose of generating profits, and therefore, are only made
for commercializing university technologies when the technologies
can survive a rigorous due diligence process. Commercially viable
university technologies that do not survive this due diligence process
fail to attract the investments necessary to advance them from
prototypes and proof-of-concepts into products and services, a chasm
known as the ―Valley of Death,‖5 which contributes significantly to
the inefficient translation of federal research dollars into economic
impact in the United States.
A significant component of the due diligence process is a
thorough evaluation of the patents protecting the university
technology. Investors and corporate partners are aware that there are
risks associated with university technology because often there is a
―disconnect‖ between the current fundamental university technology
and the future commercial embodiments of that technology. The due
diligence process evaluates whether the claims of the patent are broad
enough to protect the current and future products and services derived
3
Jerry Thursby & Sukanya Kemp, Growth and Productive Efficiency of University
Intellectual Property Licensing, 31 RES. POL‘Y 109, 109 (2002) (―It has been suggested in a
number of venues that university resources are not fully exploited as a source of economic
growth and competitiveness and recent public policy has been aimed at increasing the
commercial impact of universities.‖).
4
Richard Jenson & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of
University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 240-41 (2001).
Perhaps the most striking result of the survey is that when they are
licensed, most university inventions are little more than a ―proof of
concept.‖ No one knows their commercial potential because they are in
such an early stage of development. Indeed, they are so embryonic that
additional effort in development by the inventor is required for a
reasonable chance of commercial success.
Id.
5
Steve H. Barr, Ted Baker, Stephen K. Markham, & Angus I. Kingon, Bridging the
Valley of Death: Lessons Learned from 14 Years of Commercialization of Technology
Education, 8 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 370, 371 (2009) (―The missing link in these
efforts is the transition from an existing or emerging technology to the creation of a
compelling new market-driven business. This institutional, financial, and skill gap is
referred to as the ‗valley of death‘ in [commercialization of technology].‖ (citations
omitted)).
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from the university technology. However, the due diligence process
also includes an assessment of whether these claims will survive
reexamination and litigation without being invalidated or
significantly narrowed.
The purpose of this paper is to explore recent interpretations
of patent law doctrines by the courts and how these interpretations
affect the scope and validity of patents covering fundamental
university technologies. Many of these interpretations have the goal
of increasing the quantity and quality of information disclosed in a
patent, a significant issue for early stage technology. A better
understanding of the effects of these holdings on fundamental
university patents by the stakeholders in university technology
commercialization will enable more efficient technology transfer
mechanisms in the United States.
Section II of this paper presents background information
associated with commercialization and patenting of fundamental
university technology. Section III discusses the claim construction
doctrine used for determining the scope of claim coverage and
analyzes a recent case where this ideological difference is brought to
the foreground. The claim construction doctrine does not invalidate
claims, but instead interprets what subject matter the patent may
exclude based on the terms used in the claims.6 Section IV discusses
the claim indefiniteness doctrine, which invalidates a claim because
the meaning of a claim term is not clearly defined in the
specification7 and a recent Federal Circuit case that applied the
indefiniteness doctrine. Section V presents the evolution of the
written description doctrine. The written description doctrine
invalidates claims where the inventor did not possess (invent) the
entire scope of the claim.8 Section VI explains the enablement
doctrine, which has long been used to police the adequacy of the
disclosure in the specification.9 The enablement doctrine invalidates
claims that cover subject matter that is not sufficiently described so
that one skilled in the art could practice the claimed invention
6

See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (establishing
Markman hearings to determine the scope of patent claims prior to patent infringement
trials).
7
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring the invention to be distinctly claimed).
8
See Gene Quinn, Patent Drafting: Defining Computer Implemented Processes,
IPWATCHDOG.COM (March 14, 2011), http://ipwatchdog.com/2011/03/14/patent-draftingdefining-computer-implemented-processes/id=15758 [hereinafter Quinn, Patent Drafting].
9
See id.
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without undue experimentation.10 Recently, the courts have become
even stricter in their application of the enablement requirement.11
Finally, Section VII discusses how the different doctrines of patent
law work together and how the stricter interpretations of Section 112
achieve better quality patents. However, this stricter interpretation
requires that universities make sure that their patents include
commercial applications and contain an adequate disclosure that
describes and enables the entire scope of their inventive technology.
II.

BACKGROUND

Commercializing university technologies is an important
component of the economic development policy in the United
States.12 President Barack Obama has recently stated that helping
small businesses commercialize innovative technologies discovered
from federally funded research and development will create jobs and
help the country recover from its economic crisis.13 Congress has
long recognized the usefulness of transferring federally funded
university technology14 to private businesses for commercialization.15
10

35 U.S.C. § 112 (―The specification shall enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains . . . to make and use the same.‖); see also Quinn, Patent Drafting, supra note 8.
11
See Quinn, Patent Drafting, supra note 8.
12
Helm & Mauroner, supra note 1.
13
Startup America, THE WHITE HOUSE, www.whitehouse.gov/issues/startup-america
(last visited Sept. 3, 2011) (quoting a speech by President Obama on Jan. 31, 2011 regarding
the Startup America initiative); see also Wendy H. Schacht, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected
Issues in Patent Policy and the Commercialization of Technology, CONG. R ES. S ERV. R EP.
Paper 23, 14 (2006) (―It is now widely accepted that ‗from one-third to one-half of all U.S.
growth has come from technical progress, and that it is the principal driving force for longterm economic growth . . . .‘ ‖); see also MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY : THE
UNIVERSITY – INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 2-3 (1986) (―[I]n stagnation periods entrepreneurs
with new ideas come forward to lead capitalism into technologies that form the basis of new
industries.‖).
14
KENNEY, supra note 13, at 30 (―[Three] great task[s] of the university [are] to perform
research that has no immediate application to production[,] . . . . to perform basic science[,]
and [to] provide ‗scientists [who are] able to offer fresh insights.‘ ‖) (citation omitted); see
also Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(allowing federal laboratories to apply for patents and transfer their technology, similar to
university technology transfer). The term ―university‖ may include government research
facilities, where federally funded research and development is similar to research performed
at universities. Id. at § 2(6)(d)(1-2).
15
See Gene Quinn, Happy Anniversary: USPTO Celebrates 30 Years of Bayh-Dole,
IPWATCHDOG . COM (Dec. 12, 2010), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/12/12/happy-anniversaryuspto-celebrates-30-years-of-bayh-dole/id=13759 [hereinafter Quinn, Happy Anniversary];
see also DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS § 26.01, 26-28 (Michael A. Epstein & Frank L.
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Under the Bayh-Dole Act universities are able to patent their
technology and license or transfer their patents to private companies
so that the technology can be brought to market.16 Consequently, the
Bayh-Dole Act has been lauded for the creation of thousands of new
businesses.17
UNIVERSITY ISSUES WITH PATENTING
Nonetheless, many university scientists are not interested in
patenting their technology (so that the university can profit from
licensing that patent), but rather, they are interested in ―engag[ing]
the scientific community‖ through scientific presentations and
publications.18 However, patenting the result of research and
development plays an important role in commercializing university
technologies. Universities use patent licenses, both to new (start-ups)
and established companies, as the primary mechanism of technology
transfer.19 In return for royalties and fees back to the university,
companies can move forward with commercializing a patentCommercialization of university
protected technology.20
technologies also serves society by creating new companies, new
jobs, and most importantly, by bringing the inventive technology to
market.21
Even though patents are critical to technology
Politano eds., Aspen Pub. 4th ed. 2010).
16
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-212; see also Schacht, supra note 13, at 4.
17
Quinn, Happy Anniversary, supra note 15.
18
Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Unveiling the Distinction Between the University and Its
Academic Researchers: Lessons for Patent Infringement and University Technology
Transfer, 12 V AND . J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 475, 483 (2010).
[I]n spite of a government requirement to disclose government-funded
inventions to the university for licensing and the university‘s
considerable interest in licensing such inventions, academic researchers
routinely publish their inventions in scientific journals without university
disclosure rather than spending the extra time required to also disclose
the inventions to the university.
Id.
19
See DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 26-10.
20
See id.
21
Schacht, supra note 13, at 5 (―Special consideration concerning patent title is given to
small businesses in part because of the role these companies were seen as playing in the
generation of new jobs and in technological advancement.‖); see also DRAFTING LICENSE
AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 26-6 (―[T]echnological breakthroughs can benefit both
humankind when the breakthroughs are patented and developed into products . . . and further
science when they are published in respected journals and presented at scientific meetings.‖).
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commercialization, many university scientists prefer to publish their
results to increase their chances of receiving further grant money.22
However, if a patent is not applied for prior to publication or
presentation of the scientific research, it may cause a loss of patent
rights.23 In order to avoid the loss of patent rights, the university may
need to quickly file a patent application that possibly does not have
an adequate disclosure of the inventive technology.24 Similarly,
attempting to patent the technology before the research is completed
or before a commercial application has been determined may also
produce an inadequate disclosure.25 As explained in this paper, an
inadequate disclosure will result in patent claims being invalidated or
being narrowed significantly.26 A company that licenses a weak
patent will likely have difficulties acquiring funding, ultimately
resulting in not being able to commercialize the inventive
technology.27 Universities and scientists need to increase the strength
of their patents, so that commercialization of their innovative
technologies can be increased.
The importance of patents was explained by the Supreme
Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,28 where the
Court stated that science is promoted when inventors receive patent
protection for their discoveries because a patent discloses those
discoveries to the public, particularly to those skilled in the art,
stimulating further work and discovery.29 Furthermore, patent
22

Carter-Johnson, supra note 18.
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (―A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States . . . .‖); see also CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY,
THE ENTREPRENEUR ‘ S GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW, 521, 531 (James W. Calhoun & Robert
Dewey eds., Westgroup 3d ed. 2008) (―[M]any countries will not grant a patent if the
invention is disclosed before the patent application is filed in that country.‖).
24
See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
25
E.g., id. at 1358 (Newman, J., additional views) (stating that a patent application for
basic scientific research was filed before a practical application was demonstrated).
26
See supra text pp. 187-88 and accompanying notes 6-11.
27
See Schacht, supra note 13, at 2; see also Mario W. Cardullo, Intellectual Property –
The Basis for Venture Capital Investments, WORLD I NTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY
ORGANIZATION , http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/venture_capital_investments.htm
(last visited October 12, 2011) (―Without the strength of the intellectual property and its
protection, little if any investments would be made into new or growing enterprises.‖).
28
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
29
Id. at 150-51 (explaining that the purpose of the patent system is to encourage the
creation and disclosure to the public of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology
23
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protection encourages companies to invest in the costly work of
innovation because competitors will not be able to copy their
technology.30
Nevertheless, some people believe that patent
protection, with its monopoly of seventeen plus years, increases the
cost of goods and services and holds back innovation rather than
promoting it.31 The speed at which new technologies are advancing
highlights this issue.32 By the time a patent is published, typically
eighteen months after the patent is filed, technological advances have
already made the invention obsolete in some areas, such as computer
electronics.33 In these areas, the technology progressed without a
patent disclosure, and yet, a subsequently obtained patent may be
used as a weapon to stop all others in the field from pursuing
and design in return for the exclusive right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the invention for a period of years and upon expiration of that period, the knowledge of the
invention is available for people to make and use the invention without restriction. Absent
the patent system, inventors would keep the details of their invention secret and innovation
would not progress as effectively as the patent system allows.); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 8 (―To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖).
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated
to the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such
additions to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the
public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price
of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure which . . . will stimulate
ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the
art.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
30
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010) (―Although there is certainly
disagreement about the need for patents, scholars generally agree that when innovation is
expensive, risky, and easily copied, inventors are less likely to undertake the guaranteed
costs of innovation in order to obtain the mere possibility of an invention that others can
copy.‖); see also Schacht, supra note 13, at 3-4.
31
Schacht, supra note 13, at 3; see also Paul Basken, Patents, Not Just Politics, Create
Obstacles to University Stem-Cell Research, C HRON . HIGHER EDUC . (Jan. 24, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/Patents-Not-Just-Politics/126045/.
32
Robert Unikel & Douglas Eveleigh, Protecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers: The
Available Patent Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 85 (2006).
Given the rapid pace of technological advance in many industries today
(biotechnology, computers, and telecommunications, to name just a
few), and given the potentially serious consequences of misapprehending
and/or misapplying the law in these areas, it is extremely important for
patentees and potential infringers/improvers to be aware of, and for
courts to come to grips with, the confusing morass of judicial decisions
regarding patent protection for after-developed technologies.
Id.
33
Dennis D. Crouch, Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling the Irrelevance of the Invention
Date in U.S. Patent Law, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 81 (2009).
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advancements in the technology area.34 This problem is further
exacerbated when one considers the many questionable patents that
have been issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(―PTO‖).35
In Bilski v. Kappos,36 the Supreme Court explained that patent
laws need to balance ―the tension . . . between stimulating innovation
by protecting inventors and impeding progress by granting patents
when not justified by the statutory design.‖37 The Court stated that
finding this balance requires an invention to be: (1) of the type the
patent laws are designed to protect (Section 101 requirement);38 (2)
novel (Section 102 requirement);39 (3) non-obvious (Section 103
requirement);40 and (4) ―fully and particularly described‖ (Section
112 requirement).41 Recently, the courts and the PTO have
emphasized the importance of fully and particularly describing an
invention to increase the quality of patents.42 Patents of poor quality
34

Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U.J.
S CI. & TECH. L. 1, 12-15 (2005); see also Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,
632 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229 (―[S]ome business method patents raise special problems
in terms of vagueness and suspect validity.‖).
36
130 S. Ct. 3218.
37
Id. at 3229.
38
Id. at 3225.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
42
Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Issues Examination
Guidelines to Better Define the Scope of Patent Protection Thereby Improve Patent Quality,
Release 11-11 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2011/11_11a.jsp
(― ‗Patent quality is essential to the proper functioning of the patent system and the
intellectual property community has long wanted the USPTO to provide additional guidance
to examiners and applicants to ensure better compliance with Section 112.‘ ‖ (quoting
Director of the USPTO, David Kappos)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (―The specification shall
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . . [and] shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.‖). Section 112 also has a best mode requirement. Id.
This requirement will not be discussed in this paper because Congress is expected to vote to
eliminate this requirement. See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2011: An Overview,
P ATENTLY -O B LOG (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/patentreform-act-of-2011-an-overview.html.
This paper will discuss claim construction,
indefiniteness, written description, and enablement doctrines because these doctrines affect
the requirement to fully and particularly describe an invention. There are other doctrines
that affect the scope of the claims such as a disclaimer, doctrine of equivalents, and reverse
doctrine of equivalents, but these are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper will not
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do not give the public notice of the protected scope of the patent—
thereby creating an unknown risk that discourages research and
development, rather than promoting it.43
A patent is comprised of a specification, which gives a broad
comprehensive description of a design, and also comprised of the
claims, which define the legal ―metes and bounds‖ of the invention
using terms known in the art (technology field) or terms defined in
the specification.44 Typically, the attorney describes embodiments
known to the inventor (i.e. commercial applications) in the
specification and then generates broad claims that cover not just the
known embodiments, but also embodiments that one of ordinary skill
in the art would be able to practice based on the description of the
invention in the specification.45 The claims can cover a physical
design (apparatus or device claims), an activity (process or method
claims), or a combination of both; and based on prior patents or
publications found by the PTO examiner, the claims may be deleted
or changed—and new claims can be added during the patent
examination process.46 In some cases, a functional claim (a method
or a method of using a device) is written to cover a multitude of ways
to perform an activity, but the specification fails to disclose
discuss the disclaimer doctrine because this doctrine pertains to the statements made by an
attorney during patent prosecution. This paper will also not discuss the doctrine of
equivalents because this doctrine is used by the courts to determine if ―two devices do the
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result.‖
Graver Tank & Mfg., Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
43
Aljalian, supra note 34, at 12-14.
44
Ronald B. Hildreth, Definition of a Patent, PRAC. L. INST. PAT. L.: PRAC. GUIDE § 1:2
(2011) (―A patent is a contract between an inventor and the U.S. government under which
the government grants the inventor a limited monopoly‖ for approximately 20 years from the
filing of the application and ―the inventor discloses the complete invention to the
public . . . .‖). See generally id. at § 2:2 (stating every patent contains ―a specification and at
least one claim. The specification describes the complete invention. Each claim defines the
legal rights of the patent owner.‖ (footnote omitted)); see generally id. at 3:3 (stating that an
examiner at the PTO examines a patent application to determine if the ―claimed subject
matter is new, useful, and unobvious over the prior art‖ in light of the specification). The
examiner may reject the claim as being non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101;
anticipated subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 102; obvious subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
103; or claimed too broadly and/or not fully described by the specification under 35 U.S.C. §
112. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 1.01, 3.01, 5.02[4], 7.01, 7.03 (2010).
An applicant may appeal a decision from an examiner at the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (―BPAI‖), and thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, and finally the United States Supreme Court. See Hildreth, supra at § 2:4.
45
See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350.
46
See Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257-58 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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(describe) embodiment covered by the claim because either (1) a
patent draftsman failed to provide the information in the patent; (2)
the inventor did not know the embodiments; or (3) the inventive
technology was ―pioneering‖ technology—so new and basic that it
starts a whole new technology area—and therefore, the inventor
could not have known about later developments (also called ―afterarising technology‖) in this new technology area.47
Should the courts allow these functional claims to exclude an
undisclosed design or activity? Should the claims be read narrowly
to cover only the disclosed design or activity? Or, on a more extreme
basis, should the claims that do not disclose in the specification the
claimed design or activity be found invalid? This depends on
whether one believes that (1) the scope of the invention is determined
by the claims and the specification should be used only to interpret
the claim terminology and to enable one skilled in the art to make and
use the claimed invention; or (2) the scope of the invention is
determined by both the claims and the description of the invention in
the specification (the specification must also define claim
terminology and enable one skilled in the art to make and use the
claimed invention).48 These different views represent an ideological
disagreement that recently has been debated in a number of cases
tried before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(―Federal Circuit‖).49
47

See id.
See Jason Rantanen, Arlington Industries v. Bridgeport Fittings: “The specification is
the heart of the patent,” P ATENTLY -O B LOG (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2011/01/arlington-industries-v-bridgeport-fittings-the-specification-is-the-heartof-the-patent.html. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d
1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding a claim to be invalid because it failed to satisfy the
requirements of an adequate written description), with Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1326-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing a lower court‘s holding which construed a claim
term to be limited to less than the full scope of its ordinary meaning). See also Ariad, 598
F.3d at 1350 (holding description of a generic invention, failed to meet the written
description requirement); see also Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257-58 (Lourie, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that claims should not be construed beyond the
descriptions embodied by the inventor).
49
See Rantanen, supra note 48; see, e.g., Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559 (affirming invalidity of
claims because of insufficient description in the claim). Compare Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328
(reversing district court‘s application of claims construction, because claim in court‘s view
was not ambiguous), with id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority
largely because ―the specification contains no disclosure of baffles at right angles‖);
compare Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350 (holding the asserted claims of the patent invalid for failure
to meet the written requirement by describing only a generic invention), with id. at 1361
(Rader, J., dissenting in part) (describing the majority as ―rejecting that statutory balance in
48
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This ideological disagreement greatly impacts university
patents where there is an inadequate description, the commercial
applications of the research were not known by the inventor, or where
the subject matter of the patent was pioneering technology and the
claims for that technology cover advances that are later invented.50 If
the courts hold that the scope of an invention is determined by both
the claims and the description of the invention in the specification,
which is the direction in which some of the judges on the Federal
Circuit seem to be headed, then many university patents may be
invalidated, or at a minimum, greatly narrowed in scope.51
III.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

It has been held by the courts for many years that ―the name
of the game is the claim,‖ meaning that the scope of the invention is
determined solely by the claims.52 In Phillips v. AWH Corp.,53 the
Federal Circuit en banc addressed to what extent a patent‘s
favor of an undefined ‗written description‘ doctrine, this court ignores the problems of
standardless decision making and serious conflicts with other areas of patent law.‖);
compare Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(dissenting because the written description provided by the inventor defines the limits to a
patent, because ―[a] patent is a teaching document. In almost all cases, the inventors, and
their patent solicitors, knew what was invented and generally disclosed their invention in
competent language.‖), with id. at 1255-56 (majority opinion) (finding error in the lower
court limiting ―spring metal adapter‖ to mean only a ―split‖ absent any extrinsic evidence
supporting such a construction). The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent
application appeals, patent interferences, and decisions of district courts throughout the
country related to patent law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Hence,
decisions from the Federal Circuit regarding patent law are similarly precedential to
decisions by the Supreme Court. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of
the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 274-76 (2002). Federal
Circuit cases are heard by a panel of three judges and depending on the ideological make-up
of the panel, case outcomes sometimes differ and when this happens, the Federal Circuit will
take the case en banc before a panel of nine judges. See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340.
50
See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353; see also Unikel & Eveleigh, supra note 32, at 86; see also
Invention, Creation, & Public Policy Symposium: Patent Reform & Innovation Incentive:
Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 IOWA F. CORP. L. 1083, 1085-86 (Summer 2009).
51
See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353 (stating that many university patents usually include
groundbreaking research which limits the patent protection since they are unable to describe
the patent with detailed specification).
52
Harold C. Wegner, Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings: The 20 Year Claim
Construction Debate, IPF RONTLINE (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.IPFrontline.com (quoting
Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT‘ L R EV. I NDUS. P ROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990)); Arlington
Indus., 632 F.3d at 1256 (quoting Rich, supra).
53
415 F.3d 1303.
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specification is relied on to determine the scope of its claims.54 The
court stated that ―[i]t is a ‗bedrock principle‘ of patent law‖ that the
claims define the scope of the invention, for which the patentee can
exclude all others from making or using.55 Yet, the claims are ―read
in view of the specification.‖56 This means that a person trying to
understand the meaning of the claims looks to ― ‗the words of the
claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution
history, and extrinsic evidence.‘ ‖57 The court also stated that one
should ―avoid the danger of reading limitations from the specification
into the claim.‖58 In fact, the court expressly stated that the claims
are not limited merely to the disclosed embodiment.59 In deciding
Phillips, the Federal Circuit found that even though the specification
did not disclose ―baffles at right angles,‖ the claims, reciting ―inward
extending structures,‖ did not limit the angle of the baffles
(structures); therefore, ―baffles at right angles‖ were covered by the
claims.60 Since Phillips was decided, it has been the most cited case
in patent law.61 Its precedent has been carefully followed with
respect to device claims, but has occasionally been brought into
question with respect to functional claims.62
Functional claims are method claims that recite steps to
achieve a particular result.63 The issue with these claims is that all
devices that perform the steps to achieve the result are covered by
these claims, including devices the patent owner never thought of or
described in the patent.64 These are the types of patents that many
people worry hold back innovation rather than promote it.

54

Id. at 1312 (holding that the specification and the prosecution history should have
greater emphasis than extrinsic sources in determining the definition of claim terms).
55
Id. (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,
1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (―The written description part of
the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the function and purpose
of claims.‖).
56
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-79).
57
Id. at 1314 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116).
58
Id. at 1323.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61
See Dennis Crouch, Top Ten Most Cited Patent Cases 2007-2010, P ATENTLY -O B LOG
(May 30, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/05/top-ten-most-cited-patent-cases2007-2010.html.
62
See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350.
63
Id. at 1349-50.
64
Id.
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In Arlington Industries v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,65 Chief
Judge Rader cited Phillips as the basis for holding that the district
court improperly imported a claim limitation from the specification.66
The question in Arlington Industries was whether the term ―spring
metal adaptor‖ in the asserted claim means ―an adaptor made of a
spring metal‖ or a metal adaptor that expands and contracts (springs)
because of a ―split.‖67 The defendant, Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,
argued that although the claim did not recite a split as other claims
did, the split was nevertheless required by the specification because
all the drawings showed a split in the adaptor, and there was no
description of an embodiment without a split.68 However, the court
found that the language in the specification did not indicate that the
inventor intended ―to limit the claims to ‗split‘ embodiments.‖69
In an interesting separate opinion, Judge Lourie questioned
whether the precedent set in Phillips should be followed.70 Judge
Lourie argued that the scope of the invention is determined by both
the claims and the description of the invention in the specification.71
―[T]he basic mandate is for claims to be interpreted in light of the
specification of which they are a part because the specification
describes what the inventors invented.‖72 In Judge Lourie‘s view, a
patent specification is a teaching document not only for the definition
of a claim term, but also for the definition of what the invention is.73
Judge Lourie stated that if the inventor invented an adaptor with a
split, the inventor should not be able to claim an adaptor without a
split.74 Perhaps, an adaptor without a split might be held to infringe
the claims under the doctrine of equivalents, but it should not literally

65

632 F.3d 1246.
See id. at 1253.
67
Id. at 1248.
68
Id. at 1253. In this litigation there were two patents at issue. Id. at 1248. The first had
no mention of an embodiment without a split, while the second incorporated by reference
another patent where there was an embodiment without a split. Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1248.
69
Id. at 1254.
70
Id. at 1258 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71
See id. at 1257. Judge Lourie concurred with the decision regarding the patent that
incorporated by reference the other patent, which had an embodiment without a split, but
dissented with the decision regarding the first patent where there was no embodiment with a
split design. Id.; see also Rantanen, supra note 48.
72
Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257.
73
Id.
74
See id. at 1258; see also Rantanen, supra note 48.
66
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infringe the claims.75 Judge Lourie explained that most inventors
teach what they have invented.76 However, a problem arises when
inventors use their patents ―as a business weapon‖ by asserting them
―against someone engaged in activity not contemplated by the
inventors as part of their invention.‖77 In this situation, the claims are
modified during prosecution to incorporate the non-contemplated
activity.78 In Judge Lourie‘s view, ―patents should be narrow‖ and
limited to what one has invented, and the specification should
―always play a role in determining what the inventor has invented
and thus help shape the scope of protection‖ that the claims cover.79
Judge Lourie advised, ―[T]he claims should not mean more than what
the specification indicates . . . the inventors invented.‖80
The position advocated by Judge Lourie would require the
inventor to think of and disclose numerous possible embodiments—
an onerous task for anyone, particularly the university scientist who
is patenting basic technology with few known commercial
applications.81 Judge Lourie ―seems willing to pay this cost because
of the greater certainty‖ of disclosure.82
In the quest for better quality patents, might the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court, or Congress accept Judge Lourie‘s
view?83 As Arlington Industries continues to be litigated, the district
court stated that the ―Federal Circuit‘s [broad claim construction] is
controversial and has some likelihood of being re-heard en banc.‖84
It is likely that the Federal Circuit will adjust the claim construction
doctrine to be more in line with the indefiniteness doctrine, the
written description doctrine, and the enablement doctrine, each
75

See Rantanen, supra note 48.
Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1257.
77
Id. at 1257-58.
78
Id. at 1258.
79
Wegner, supra note 52.
80
Arlington, 632 F.3d at 1258.
81
See Rantanen, supra note 48.
82
Id.
83
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (quoting O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 121 (1853)
(stating that an inventor ―can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described, and if
he claims more his patent is void‖)).
84
Dennis Crouch, Patently-O Bits & Bytes by Lawrence Higgins, P ATENTLY -O B LOG
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/03/patently-o-bits-bytes-bylawrence-higgins-1.html (regarding the Arlington district court opinion citing Jason
Rantanen‘s Patently-O blog post). Furthermore, ―[t]he district court favorably noted the
‗over 100‘ comments that had been added to the post.‖ Id.
76
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described below. If this is the case, it is imperative that university
patents contain an adequate disclosure of their inventive technology
with as many commercial applications as possible.
IV.

CLAIM INDEFINITENESS

Judge Lourie‘s position finds some support in the claim
indefiniteness doctrine. Under this doctrine, a claim that does not
clearly delineate the boundaries of an invention will be found
invalid.85 This typically occurs when a claim term is not clearly
defined in the specification.86 When a university quickly files a
patent application to avoid the loss of patent rights, it is likely that
one or more of the claim terms are not clearly defined in the
specification. This can also happen when the scientist has minimal
industrial contact and does not know the multiple meanings of one or
more terms within that industry.
In Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., v. M-I LLC,87 the
Federal Circuit stated:
Because claims delineate the patentee‘s right to
exclude, the patent statute requires that the scope of
the claims be sufficiently definite to inform the public
of the bounds of the protected invention, i.e., what
subject matter is covered by the exclusive rights of the
patent.
Otherwise, competitors cannot avoid
infringement, defeating the public notice function of
patent claims.88
In Halliburton, the court held that the asserted patent was invalid
because the degree of fragility for the claim term ―fragile gel‖ was
not identified in the specification causing the claim to be indefinite.89
The court reasoned that this allowed the claims to cover not only
Halliburton‘s invention, but also the prior art and all future
improvements to the gel‘s fragility.90
85

See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring the invention to be distinctly claimed).
See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(stating that a claim is indefinite when the bounds of a claim are so ambiguous that a skilled
artisan cannot determine the boundaries of the claim based on the specification).
87
514 F.3d 1244.
88
Id. at 1249.
89
Id. at 1254.
90
Id.
86
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The Federal Circuit has also used the indefiniteness doctrine
to invalidate means-plus-function claims that do not have a
corresponding structure in the specification,91 claims that include
numeric limitations ―without disclosing [in the specification] which
of multiple methods of measuring that number should be used,‖92 and
claims that contain a term that is ―completely dependent on a
person‘s subjective opinion.‖93
V.

WRITTEN DESCRIPTION

The Federal Circuit explained in Ariad Pharms. Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co.94 that in many instances the specification of a university
patent does not contain specific examples, and the functional claims
are directed to a process that solves a problem and covers every
device that can perform the process or every compound developed by
the process.95 This happens because ―universities may not have the
resources or inclination to work out the practical implications of
[their] research‖ (the patent was applied for too early or the
commercial application was not determined).96 This is different,
however, from after-arising technologies, which cannot be described
in the specification of a pioneering patent because the inventor could
not have known about further developments in the new technology
area.97 In his dissenting opinion in Ariad, Chief Judge Rader
explained that it has been long-established law that pioneering
patents which block the practice of after-arising technology must be
licensed.98 Furthermore, ―[t]his blocking condition can exist even
where the original patentee ‗failed to contemplate‘ an additional
element found in the improvement patent.‖99 However, Judge Lourie
and other judges on the Federal Circuit have held that the written
91
Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (―If there
is no structure in the specification corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation in the
claims, the claim will be found invalid as indefinite.‖).
92
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d at 1250 (citing Honeywell Int‘l, Inc. v. Int‘l
Trade Comm‘n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
93
Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
94
598 F.3d 1336.
95
Id. at 1352.
96
Id. at 1353.
97
Unikel, supra note 32, at 86; see also Invention, Creation, & Public Policy Symposium,
supra note 50, at 1086.
98
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting).
99
Id. (quoting A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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description requirement mandates that an inventor ―possess‖ an
invention in order for his patent to exclude others from making it.100
The requirement for a written description has been a
conflicting area of law for more than a decade.101 Although there has
always been a written description requirement with regard to a later
filed application claiming priority (an earlier filing date) to an earlier
filed application, the requirement was not applied to patents not
claiming priority.102 However in The Regents of the University of
California v. Eli Lilly,103 decided in 1997, the Federal Circuit applied
the written description requirement ―apart from enablement and
beyond the priority context.‖104 In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit, with
Judge Lourie writing the opinion for the court, held that the written
description requirement is separate from the enablement requirement
and is necessary in all specifications for patent validity.105 The court
found that the specification provided an adequate description for rat
insulin cDNA, but it did not provide an adequate description for
mammalian insulin cDNA even though the method claims covered
both.106 The court stated that the written description requirement of
Section 112 required that the invention be described in the
specification ―in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly
conclude that ‗the inventor invented the claimed invention.‘ ‖107 The
requirement mandates that a ― ‗precise definition, such as by
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties‘ ‖ be in the
specification.108 A mere statement of the DNA and a ―potential
method for isolating it‖ is not enough.109 In addition, ―a description
100

Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1360 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); see also id. at 1340 (majority opinion) (agreeing
to hear the case en banc to settle written description requirement); see also Lizardtech, Inc.
v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc. (Lizardtech II), 433 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J.,
dissenting from the court‘s decision not to hear the case en banc); see also Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from the
court‘s decision not to hear the case en banc).
102
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
103
119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
104
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also id.
at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (stating that the doctrine of
claim construction and the enablement doctrine provide the required limitations for the scope
of an invention). The enablement doctrine is described in the next section.
105
Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562.
106
Id. at 1566.
107
Id. (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
108
Id. (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
109
Id. at 1566-67 (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170).
101
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which renders obvious a claimed invention‖ is also not enough.110
The University of California argued that it disclosed a general
method of isolating cDNA and a specific example of a species
covered by the generic claimed, which together enabled one skilled in
the art to make and use the entire genus.111 The court held that a
description of one species of a genus is not a description of the whole
genus and that the specification must contain a description of the
entire invention in addition to enabling the entire invention.112 The
court explained that a description by function only describes what a
genus does, and not what the genus is.113
After Eli Lilly, a number of Federal Circuit cases specifically
addressed the written description requirement.114 Many of the
technologies were developed and patented by universities,115 and
most of these cases involved patents for biotechnology or
pharmaceuticals that had broad generic functional claims with a
description of only one species.116 In Carnegie Mellon University v.
Hoffman-LA Roche Inc.,117 the Federal Circuit refined its standard
stating that ―[f]or inventions in an unpredictable art, adequate written
description of a genus which embraces widely variant species cannot
be achieved by disclosing only one species within the genus.‖118 The

110

Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 (citing Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572).
Id.
112
Id. at 1568.
113
Id.
114
E.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340; Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541
F.3d 1115, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Lizardtech II, 433 F.3d at 1374; Invitrogen Corp. v.
Clontech Labs., 429 F.3d 1052, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 917 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Enzo,
323 F.3d at 960.
115
E.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340 (involving ―methods for regulating cellular responses to
external stimuli by reducing NF-kB activity in a cell‖ developed by MIT and Harvard
College); Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1118 (involving isolated DNA developed by
Carnegie Mellon); Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 918 (involving a pharmaceutical product
developed by the University of Rochester).
116
E.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340 (involving ―methods for regulating cellular responses to
external stimuli by reducing NF-kB activity in a cell‖); Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1118
(involving isolated DNA); Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 918 (involving a pharmaceutical
product).
117
541 F.3d 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
118
Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1124 (italics omitted) (quoting The Guidelines for
Examination of Patent Applications under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, ―Written Description‖
Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 10-99, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001)).
111
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written description will only be adequate if a representative number
of species are disclosed that show ―one of skill in the art would
recognize that the applicant was in possession of the necessary
common attributes or features of the elements possessed by the
members of the genus in view of the species disclosed.‖119 The court
further explained:
[W]hat is needed to support generic claims to
biological subject matter depends on a variety of
factors, such as the existing knowledge in the
particular field, the extent and content of the prior art,
the maturity of the science or technology, the
predictability of the aspect at issue, and other
considerations appropriate to the subject matter.120
One case, where the asserted claims were not for a technology
in the unpredictable arts of chemistry and biology, was Lizardtech,
Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc.121 The method claims asserted
by Lizardtech and the Regents of the University of California were
directed to software.122 The court held that the claims for software
that perform an image compression technique called seamless
discrete wavelet transformation (DWT) were invalid because the
specification only described ―maintaining updated sums of [the]
DWT coefficients‖ rather than performing a seamless DWT.123 The
court further explained that the written description requirement
usually rises and falls with the enablement requirement because ―a
recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full
breadth of the claim is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the
inventor possesses the full scope of the invention, and vice versa.‖124
The court reasoned that in this case ―a person of skill in the art would
not understand how to make a seamless DWT generically and would
not understand Lizardtech to have invented a method for making
seamless DWT,‖ only a method of maintaining updated sums of the
DWT.125 In a dissenting opinion for the court‘s denial to rehear the
119

Id. (citing The Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications, supra note 118).
Id. at 1126 (quoting Capon, 418 F.3d at 1359).
121
(Lizardtech I), 424 F.3d 1336, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
122
Id. (involving a software image compression technique developed by the Regents of
the University of California).
123
Id. at 1344.
124
Id. at 1345.
125
Id.
120
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case en banc, Judge Rader discussed the lack of clarity for the proper
written description test.126 Judge Rader further explained that the
evolving written description doctrine is inconsistent with the court‘s
decision in Phillips, because Phillips states that limitations from the
specification should not be read into the claims, yet the written
description doctrine requires the claims to be limited to what is
described in the specification.127
Notably, in ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems,
Inc.,128 the Federal Circuit held that the claims, which were device
claims directed to subject matter in the predictable arts, were
invalid.129 The court stated that the device claims overreached the
scope of the inventor‘s contribution to the field of art because the
claims were broad enough to cover both valves that had a spike and
valves that did not have a spike, but the specification only disclosed
valves with a spike; therefore, the written description requirement
was not fulfilled and the claims were invalid.130 Although the court
questioned importing limitations from the specification, citing
Phillips, the court explained, ― ‗[T]he line between construing terms
and importing limitations can be discerned with reasonable certainty
and predictability if the court‘s focus remains on understanding how
a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim
terms.‘ ‖131 The court determined that one skilled in the art would
understand the claims to cover only valves with a spike because the
specification did not describe piercing by the spike as being optional,
there was no suggestion the piercing could be accomplished by
anything other than a pointed spike, and the figures only showed a
pointed spike.132 These cases show that even in the stable arts, patent
scope is narrowed when all embodiments are not envisioned to allow
a sufficient description in the specification—likewise a concern for
university patents.
126

Lizardtech II, 433 F.3d at 1380 (denying rehearing en banc).
Id. at 1381.
128
558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
129
Id. at 1379; but see Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container
Corp., 635 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that original claims can show
possession of the invention however ―claims to a functionally defined genus, will not satisfy
the written description requirement without a disclosure showing that the applicant had
invented species sufficient to support the claim‖).
130
ICU Medical, 558 F.3d at 1378.
131
Id. at 1375 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323).
132
Id.
127
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In order to bring certainty to the written description doctrine,
the Federal Circuit agreed to hear Ariad en banc.133 Ariad asserted
patent claims for a method of reducing the activity of ―a previously
unknown protein, called NF-kB . . . found to mediate certain
intracellular signaling . . . . [thereby] reduc[ing] the symptoms of
certain diseases.‖134 The technology was developed and patented by
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard College, and the
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research.135 Similar to Eli Lilly,
the inventor claimed a method encompassing a genus while the
specification disclosed only a single species.136
The Federal Circuit upheld the requirement for a written
description that teaches the entire scope of the claimed invention in
the specification.137 Judge Lourie, writing for the majority, asserted
that ―it is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession‖ of
the claimed invention.138 He explained that an invention must be
fully and particularly described so that ― ‗the scope of the right to
exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the
inventor‘s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent
specification.‘ ‖139 The court‘s decision clarified the test for a
sufficient written description as, ―whether the disclosure of the
application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art
that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of
the filing date.‖140 Showing possession of the invention varies
depending on the scope of the claims, the existing knowledge in the
technology field, the prior art, the maturity of the technology, and the
predictability of the art.141 The court did not identify a specific form
of disclosure required to meet the written description requirement;
however, it did state that a description that merely makes the
invention obvious is not enough.142 Judge Rader and Judge Linn did
not agree with the majority‘s position.143 They believed that the
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340.
Id. at 1358-59 (Newman, J., additional views).
Id. at 1340 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1344.
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.
Id. at 1353-54 (quoting Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 920).
Id. at 1351 (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also
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enablement doctrine is sufficient to meet the requirements of Section
112, and a written description requirement is only necessary in the
priority context.144 Judge Rader explained in his dissent that a
patentee cannot foresee future improvements to incorporate them into
the specification and yet ―[t]he Supreme Court has long
acknowledged the ‗well established‘ rule that ‗an improver cannot
appropriate the basic patent of another and that the improver without
a license is an infringer and may be sued as such.‘ ‖145 He further
explained that a blocking condition typically occurs when ―a
pioneering patent claims a genus and an improvement patent later
claims a species of that genus.‖146 Judge Rader‘s concern with the
new written description doctrine was that ―mere improvements will
likely invalidate genus patents.‖147 Because many university patents
are for pioneering technologies with unknown improvements, the
written description requirement will greatly impact the validity of
their claims.
Ariad, sharing the same concern, complained that the written
description doctrine disadvantages universities because ―basic
research cannot be patented.‖148 The court responded to this criticism
by explaining that ―[p]atents are not awarded for academic
theories . . . . ‗but compensation for its successful conclusion.‘ ‖149
Judge Newman joined the court‘s opinion, but in an additional views
section stated that the real issue Ariad faced was that its research
―was taken to the patent system before its practical application was
demonstrated.‖150 In requiring a written description that is separate
from enablement and the priority context, the Federal Circuit is
requiring universities to apply their basic research to at least one
practical application and preferably many more when trying to
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc. (Univ. of Rochester II), 375 F.3d 1303, 1307
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 1325 (Linn. J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Enzo, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 987 (Linn, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
144
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361-64 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at
1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
145
Id. at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (quoting Temca Elec.
Motor Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co., 275 U.S. 319, 328 (1928)).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 1366.
148
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353 (majority opinion).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1358 (Newman, J., additional views).
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achieve broader patent scope.
VI.

ENABLEMENT

When universities quickly file a patent application, it is likely
that they have not enabled their invention because they have not put
enough thought and time into providing an adequate disclosure.151 In
Ariad, Judges Rader and Linn questioned whether Section 112
requires a separate written description of the invention; however,
there was no question that Section 112 requires the invention to be
―enabled.‖152 The enablement doctrine requires ―the specification of
a patent [to] teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the
full scope of the claimed invention without ‗undue
experimentation.‘ ‖153 ―Whether undue experimentation is needed is
not a single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion
reached by weighing many factual considerations.‖154 The factual
considerations the courts will look at are the Wands factors, which
are:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the
presence or absence of working examples, (4) the
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art,
(6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
breadth of the claims.155
In Penda Corp. v. United States,156 the Federal Circuit stated
that the scope of the enablement in the specification ―must bear a
reasonable relationship‖ with the scope of the claims.157 ―In arts
involving predictable factors, such as patents in the mechanical or
electrical arts, a single embodiment provides broad enablement . . . .
[I]n arts involving unpredictable factors, such as chemistry and
151
E.g., id. (stating that a patent application for basic scientific research was filed before a
practical application was demonstrated).
152
Id. at 1361 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Ariad, 598 F.3d at
1367 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
153
In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 ).
154
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
155
Id.
156
29 Fed. Cl. 533 (1993).
157
Id. at 556.
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physiology, the requisite scope of enablement varies inversely with
the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved.‖158 To improve
the quality of patents, the Federal Circuit has shifted this philosophy
and, even in the predictable arts, has limited the ability of a single
embodiment to provide support for broad claims that cover different
embodiments.
In Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad,159 the Federal Circuit heard
two appeals: first on the district court‘s claim construction160 and
then, after remand, on whether the claims were invalid due to the lack
of a written description and enablement.161 The claims, as originally
filed, recited a pressure jacket, but during prosecution the pressure
jacket limitation was removed, likely because Liebel found out
Medrad‘s device did not have a pressure jacket.162 The district court
construed the claims as requiring a pressure jacket.163 The Federal
Circuit in Liebel I held that the scope of the claim was broader than
the district court‘s interpretation because ―although all the described
embodiments include a pressure jacket, the disclosure did not clearly
disavow embodiments lacking a pressure jacket.‖164 On remand, the
district court held that ―the claims were invalid for lack of written
description because the specification d[id] not describe a jacketless
injector.‖165 Furthermore, the district court, after considering the
Wands factors, held that the claims were also invalid for lack of
enablement because ―no prototypes of a jacketless injector had been
made or described at the time of filing, and that the state of the art
was such that a jacketless system with a disposable syringe would
have been a ‗true innovation.‘ ‖166 On appeal, the Federal Circuit did
not consider invalidity based on written description because it first
held that the claims were invalid based on lack of enablement.167
Liebel argued that the claims were enabled because the
158

Id.
Liebel I, 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Liebel II, 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
160
Liebel I, 358 F.3d at 900.
161
Liebel II, 481 F.3d at 1373.
162
Id. at 1374. ―[A] pressure jacket [is] necessary to ‗maintain the integrity of the syringe
housing against pressures the syringe encounters during operation of the injector.‘ ‖ Id. at
1375.
163
Id. at 1374.
164
Id. at 1374-75.
165
Liebel II, 481 F.3d at 1375.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 1380.
159
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asserted claims required neither a pressure jacket nor the absence of a
pressure jacket and the specification enabled its preferred
embodiment of a syringe with a pressure jacket.168 Liebel also argued
that after reading the specification, one skilled in the art would only
be required to do additional work and not undue experimentation to
produce a jacketless injector because its invention pertained to the
mechanical arts in which ―a single embodiment can enable a broad
claim.‖169 Medrad argued that ―although every embodiment of a
claim does not need to be disclosed in the specification, the
disclosure must teach the full range of embodiments in order for the
claims to be enabled, and here the disclosure does not teach an
injector without a pressure jacket.‖170 The Federal Circuit agreed
with Medrad and stated ―[t]hat [the] full scope must be enabled.‖171
The court reasoned that the patent taught away from jacketless
injectors, that pressure jackets were in every figure and every
discussion of every figure, and that testimonial evidence showed that
a jacketless injector was not known at the time of filing.172 The court
ended with this final statement:
The irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully
pressed to have its claims include a jacketless system,
but, having won that battle, it then had to show that
such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could
not meet. The motto, ―beware of what one asks for,‖
might be applicable here.173
Similarly, in Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v.
BMW,174 the Federal Circuit held that broad claims that covered both
mechanical and electrical sensors for side impact airbags were not
enabled because the specification described mechanical sensors but
had only a vague description of an electronic switch.175 The court
explained that the specification and the figures only had a concept

168

Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1378-79.
170
Liebel II, 481 F.3d at 1378.
171
Id. at 1379.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 1380.
174
501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
175
Id. at 1282; see also Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that broad claims that covered video games and movies were not enabled because
the specification only taught the use of video games).
169
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and not a specific design, and that the ―mere boxed figure of the
electronic sensor and the few lines of description‖ would not teach
one skilled in the art to make and use an electronic sensor.176 Even
though Automotive Technologies International argued that one
skilled in the art would know the missing information, the court
stated:
[T]he rule that a specification need not disclose what
is well known in the art is ―merely a rule of
supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling
disclosure.‖ . . . ―[O]mission of minor details does not
cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement
requirement. However, when there is no disclosure of
any specific starting material or of any of the
conditions under which a process can be carried out,
undue experimentation is required.‖177
The court noted that the mechanical sensor required two columns of
description and the electronic sensor needed a similar disclosure.178
Even though enablement of broad claims is more easily achieved in
the mechanical and electrical arts because a description of how to
make and use one or a few embodiments allows a person skilled in
the art to make and use a broad range of embodiments, these cases
show that this is not always the case.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In his quest for better quality patents, the Director of the PTO,
David Kappos, explained recently that the Ariad decision is important
because after enablement, the written description requirement ensures
that applicants‘ claims do not cover more than they are entitled to
cover, i.e. more than they have invented and disclosed.179 The
written description requirement protects the integrity of the patent
system, by invalidating over-broad patents, especially method claims
that claim the problem to be solved or the results to be achieved
176

Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1283.
Id. at 1283-84 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
178
Id. at 1284.
179
Symposium, Thoughts from the George Washington University Law School
Symposium on Intellectual Property: Building Bridges and Making Connections Across the
IP System, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 273 (2010) (Remarks by David J. Kappos).
177
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rather than claiming how those results are actually achieved.180
Kappos describes the use of three patent law filters working
together to set the boundaries of claim coverage in each patent. 181 He
explains that some claims may be so over-broad that they fail to meet
the requirements of patentable subject matter (Section 101) because
their broadness makes them an abstract idea with no physical
limitations.182 In this scenario, Section 101 acts as a coarse (first)
filter invalidating claims that encompass mental processes performed
by a person, laws of nature, or other such abstractions.183 Next,
Section 112 acts as a fine (second) filter because it ensures that the
full scope of the claims is fully described and fully enabled, i.e. that
the applicant described how to make and use an invention that the
applicant actually possessed.184 Finally, Sections 102 and 103 act as
an even finer (third) filter so that the boundaries of the invention are
defined to be novel and non-obvious over the prior art.185 Since the
Supreme Court decided Bilski in 2010, in which the Court declined to
provide a test for determining what an abstract idea is, the PTO has
begun to reject many broad claims using Section 112.186
As the Federal Circuit and the PTO strive to increase the
quality of patents, it appears that broad claim language and especially
―functional claim language that sweepingly encompasses after-arising
technology‖ will likely be found invalid under either the
indefiniteness doctrine, the written description doctrine, or the
enablement doctrine.187 Furthermore, it is likely that the Federal
Circuit will adjust the claim construction doctrine to be in line with
these doctrines, thereby greatly narrowing the scope of broad
claims.188 Hence, broad functional claims, even for technology areas
in the stable arts, which do not disclose specific embodiments
(applications) in the specification, will be limited in scope to those

180

Id.
Id.
182
Id.; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229.
183
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229.
184
Invention, Creation, & Public Policy Symposium, supra note 50 at 1113, n.168.
185
Id. at 1083.
186
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258-59 (Breyer, J., concurring).
187
Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the
Baseline of Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, P ATENTLY O-P ATENT L.J. 60,
70 (2010).
188
See supra notes 84-85.
181

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 [2012], Art. 8

210

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 28

embodiments disclosed.189 If the claims are not limited, they may be
invalidated under the written description doctrine or the enablement
doctrine.190 Although one may think that a patent with broad claims
is better for attracting business commercialization, if the courts
invalidate similarly broad claims in other patents, then the claims will
have a cloud over them (be in doubt) and investors will likely be
discouraged from investing in technology that may lack patent
protection.191
Patents that promote commercialization of a technology, are
patents that (1) have claims that will be held valid by the courts, (2)
protect the technology that will be brought to market, and (3) do not
have claim limitations that can be easily designed around.192
Accordingly, universities should make sure that in addition to broad
functional claims, they also have narrow claims that cover specific
embodiments that are adequately described in the specification. This
increased emphasis on the requirements of Section 112 necessitates
that university patent applications are filed when research is further
developed and at a minimum, one and preferably many commercial
applications are known, so that it can be enabled, broader patent
scope can be obtained, the terms can be properly defined, and it
meets the requirement of the written description doctrine. Claims
that are limited to specific embodiments, which are fully and
distinctly described in the specification, will withstand scrutiny but
may fail to prevent others from entering the technology field.
Therefore, it is also important for universities to submit new patent
applications for any future developments of the technology.

189

See supra notes 84-85.
Liebel II, 481 F.3d at 1378-80.
191
See Gene Quinn, Show Me the IP! Venture Capital Success Based on Patents,
IPWATCHDOG . COM (Mar. 12, 2010), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/03/12/venture-capitalsuccess-based-on-patents/id=9657/.
192
Id.
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